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ALICE WAS NO RABBIT HOLE: WHY SOFTWARE INVENTORS 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
After a litany of decisions regarding the patentability of software-related 
processes dating back to the 1970s and 1980s, with Gottschalk v. Benson1 and 
Diamond v. Diehr2 as prime examples, the U.S. Supreme Court in Alice Corp v. 
CLS Bank International3 reaffirmed basic principles of patent eligibility. Thus, 
some would argue that the writing was on the wall and no one in the know should 
have been surprised at the holding in Alice. But surprise or no surprise, the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office patent issuance rate for process-related4 patent claims 
dropped to 3.6% from 47% after the Alice decision.5 The inability to protect 
innovation does not negate the value and utility of one’s innovation; so naturally 
innovators have turned to other means of protecting the value and secrecy of their 
inventions without the blessing of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). 
This Article provides an overview of the regulatory landscape before and since 
Alice as it relates to the patentability of software process/method claims by: 
(i) analyzing key court decisions like Benson and Diehr as a foundation for Alice, 
and how the Alice decision went on to play a role in the denial of other similar 
process claims related to software solutions, such as the claim at issue in Tenon & 
Groove, LLC v. Plusgrade S.E.C.;6 (ii) highlighting perils of practicing patents and 
measures being taken to reform the business model employed by non-practicing 
entities (also known as patent trolls); (iii) exploring intellectual property strategies 
that are associated with trade secrets, including proposed national legislation, and 
the means by which trade secrets can be protected on an international basis;  and 
(iv) exploring the use of trade secrets as a means to protect innovations in the post-
Alice IP landscape (particularly for patent-ineligible software processes). 
  
                                                
* © 2016 Sherman G. Helenese. Technology and Intellectual Property Partner at 
Garvey Schubert Barer, Seattle, WA.    
1 409 U.S. 63 (1972).  
2 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
3 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
4 Process means “process, art or method, and includes a new use of known process, 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012). 
5 Robert Sachs, A Survey of Patent Invalidations Since Alice, LAW360 (Jan. 13, 2015, 
10:25 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/604235/a-survey-of-patent-invalidations-
since-alice [https://perma.cc/CY4U-7V4M]. 
6 No. 1:12-cv-01118-GMS-SRF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29455 (D. Del. Mar. 11, 
2015).   
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A.  Gottschalk v. Benson 
 
The genesis of Gottschalk was a decision by the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (“Patent Office”) to reject a patent application for a computer program that 
converted binary-coded decimal numerals into binary numerals.7 On appeal to the 
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“Patent Appeals Court”), the court 
reversed the Patent Office rejection, and the U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted 
the Patent Office’s petition for a writ of certiorari.8 In the Court’s words, the 
claimant sought to patent “the ordinary arithmetic steps a human would use by 
changing the order of the steps, changing the symbolism for writing the multiplier 
used in some steps, and by taking subtotals after each successive operation.”9 The 
question before the Court was whether the patent claim fell within the meaning of 
35 U.S.C. § 100(b), which the Court cited, defining “process” as “art or method, 
and whether this includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or material.”10 In overturning the Patent Appeals Court and 
rejecting the respondents’ claim, the Court relied upon the long-standing rule that a 
novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may 
be a patentable invention, but a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of 
it, is not.11 Thus, “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental 
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the 
basic tools of scientific and technological work.”12  
In this case the Court held that the “process” claim was “so abstract and 
sweeping” that it would “cover both known and unknown uses of. . . binary 
conversion,”13 pointing out that the “clue to the patentability of a process claim 
that does not include particular machines” is the “[t]ransformation and reduction of 
an article ‘to a different state or thing.’”14 The Court reasoned that granting a 
patent in this case “would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in 
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself,” and therefore the 
claimed process was not patentable.15 
 
B.  Diamond v. Diehr 
 
In Diamond v. Diehr,16 the respondents sought to patent a mathematical 
computer-executed equation used in the curing process of synthetic rubber.17 
                                                
7 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972). 
8 In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev’d, sub nom. Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
9 Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67. 
10 Id. at 64 n.2. 
11 Id. at 67 (quoting Mackay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)). 
12 Id. at 67. 
13 Id. at 68. 
14 Id. at 70 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876)). 
15 Id. at 72. 
16 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 176 (1981). 
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Relying upon Gottschalk, both the Patent Office and Patent Appeals Court rejected 
respondents’ claim as nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which 
provides for the issuance of patents to whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof.18 
The mathematical equation involved in the Diamond patent claim dated to the 
1800s and was based on the work of Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius.19 The 
computer program used the mathematical equation to: 
 
constantly measur[e] the actual temperature inside [a] mold. These 
temperature measurements [were] then automatically fed into a computer 
which repeatedly recalculates the cure time by use of the Arrhenius 
equation. When the recalculated time equals the actual time that has 
elapsed since the press was closed, the computer signals a device to open 
the press. According to the respondents, the continuous measuring of the 
temperature inside the mold cavity, the feeding of this information to a 
digital computer which constantly recalculates the cure time, and the 
signaling by the computer to open the press, are all new in the art.20 
 
In its analysis, the Court relied upon prior holdings defining the nature of a 
patentable process, pointing out that it was undisputable that “a process may be 
patentable, irrespective of the particular form of the instrumentalities used”: 
 
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given 
result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter 
to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and 
useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language 
of the patent law, it is an art. The machinery pointed out as suitable to 
perform the process may or may not be new or patentable; whilst the 
process itself may be altogether new, and produce an entirely new result. 
The process requires that certain things should be done with certain 
substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this 
may be of secondary consequence.21 
 
Because respondents did not seek to “pre-empt the use of [the Arrhenius] 
equation,” but “[r]ather [sought] only to foreclose from others the use of that 
equation in conjunction with all of the other steps . . . claimed [in the] process,” the 
Court reversed the decisions below.22 Moreover, in distinguishing the result from 
                                                                                                                       
17 Id. at 178–79. 
18 Id. at 179–81. 
19 See id. at 177–78. 
20 Id. at 178–79. 
21 Id. at 183–84 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876)). 
22 Id. at 187. 
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Gottschalk, the Court was careful to emphasize how use of the algorithm in 
conjunction with other processes transformed into something new.23 “Obviously, 
one does not need a ‘computer’ to cure natural or synthetic rubber, but if the 
computer use incorporated in the process patent significantly lessens the possibility 
of ‘overcuring’ or ‘undercuring,’ the process as a whole does not thereby become 
unpatentable subject matter.”24 Additionally, the “process is a mode of treatment of 
certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts performed 
upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or 
thing. . . . is just as patentable as is a piece of [new] machinery.”25 
 
C.  Alice v. CLS Bank 
 
In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,26 the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled that a generic computer program could not transform a business 
method into a patent-eligible invention.27 Specifically, the Court held that 
computer-implemented inventions consisting of “[1] a method for exchanging 
financial obligations, [2] a computer system configured to carry out the method for 
exchanging obligations, and [3] a computer-readable medium containing program 
code for performing the method of exchange obligations” are not patent-eligible 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.28 
The Court applied a two-part test established by an earlier case, Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,29 under which it (1) identified 
whether the claims involve “patent-ineligible concepts,” and (2) if so, determined 
if the same is an “inventive concept.”30 The number and prestige of companies that 
filed amicus briefs in the Alice case—Microsoft, Adobe, Hewlett-Packard, Google, 
and Amazon were among those that submitted briefing—indicates the importance 
of the issues at play.31 The majority of the amici argued that the patents should be 
invalidated, but they disagreed as to the reasoning.32 Ultimately, the Court held that 
the processes associated with the software program were determined to be patent 
                                                
23 Id. at 183, 216. 
24 Id. at 187. 
25 Id. at 183. 
26 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
27 Id. at 2360. 
28 Id. at 2349. 
29 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
30 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
31 See generally S. Ct. Docket, No. 13-289 (May 10, 2013) (listing briefs filed by 
numerous companies and organizations).   
32 See Patrick J. Hughes, Diverse Groups Agree on High Court Review of Computer-
Implemented Patents, 2013 WL 5629598, WESTLAW INTELLECTUAL PROP. DAILY 
BRIEFING (“While a slew of amici curiae want resolution to what the Intellectual Property 
Law Association of Chicago called ‘conflicting tests’ for patent eligibility under Section 
101 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 101, their briefs express varying reasons for doing 
so.”). 
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ineligible and not inventive,33 reasoning that method patent claims that “merely 
require generic computer implementation fail[] to transform that abstract idea into 
a patent-eligible invention”34 and that “the computer components of [the patent’s] 
method ad[ded] nothing . . . that [was] not already present when the steps [were] 
considered separately.”35 
Under the ruling in Alice, patent claims that simply take an abstract idea and 
use a computer to implement that idea will be considered ineligible for patent 
protection.36 Of note, the Court did not make a statement as to what kinds of 
software can be patented, and did not even use the word “software” in its ruling.37 
 
D.  Tenon v. Plusgrade 
 
In Tenon v. Plusgrade,38 Tenon brought a patent infringement action to 
defend and protect its concurrent optimization software solution that was used in 
the airline industry.39 The district court described Tenon’s software as: 
 
[a] computer-implemented method for concurrent optimization of value 
in a transaction between at least two entities, comprising: 
a. providing a data store containing data representing, with respect to at 
least one product, at least one option offered by a first of said 
entities; 
b. operating a server with which a second of said entities may interact 
for at least said option; 
c. operating a server to receive inputs for at least said option and to 
search the data store for eligibility of products for at least said 
option; 
d. displaying the search results; 
e. receiving at least one decision of the second entity about the 
acceptance of at least one of said search results comprising 
acceptance of an option offered by said first entity; and 
f. operating an event optimizer system to receive data at least 
pertaining to said acceptance, and in response to the occurrence of at 
least one event selected from a set of multiple predetermined 
potential events, execute a corresponding event specific response 
algorithm; 
                                                
33 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2347–48. 
34 Id. at 2352. 
35 Id. at 2359 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc, 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1298 (2012)).  
36 Id. at 2360. 
37 Id. 
38 No. 1:12-cv-01118-GMS-SRF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29455 (D. Del. Mar. 11, 
2015).   
39 Id. at *3.  
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wherein at least one of the servers or the event optimizer system 
concurrently optimizes a value for at least two entities and 
determines how the first party will satisfy the accepted option.40 
The software included the customer product upgrade function, described as 
[a] computer-implemented method to provide options on products, 
comprising: 
a. operating a computer system to receive at least [one] input from a 
customer defining a request for an option for an upgrade for a 
product; 
b. operating a computer system to provide to a customer an option for a 
product upgrade upon occurrence of specified conditions accepted by 
the customer and further on condition that the customer relinquish at 
least one right and a company has the right to enforce said 
relinquishment upon occurrence of the specified conditions and to 
provide the upgrade; 
c. recording in a computer readable data store the option, the specified 
conditions and relinquishment terms; 
d. operating a computer system to process the information in the 
computer readable data store and automatically provide the upgrade 
to the customer when conditions on the upgrade opportunity are 
satisfied; and 
e. recording the provision of the upgrade in a computer readable data 
store.41 
 
In ruling that Tenon’s software was an abstract idea and thus patent ineligible, 
the district court applied not only the two-prong test in Alice (which was first used 
in Mayo42) but also the machine-or-transformation test.43 Under the latter test, a 
process is patent eligible if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or 
(2) it transforms a particular article into a different thing.44 As for Tenon and its 
software, the court concluded that “claiming a software implementation of a purely 
mental process that could otherwise be performed without the use of a computer 
does not satisfy the machine prong of the machine-or-transformation test.”45 
  
                                                
40 Id. at *5–6. 
41 Id. at *6–7. 
42 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
43 Tenon, at *12. 
44 Id. at *11–12. 
45 Id. at *12 (quoting CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).  
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II.  OVERVIEW OF RECENT LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES AIMED AT CURBING THE 
PERILS OF THE PATENT ECOSYSTEM 
 
The software solutions from Gottschalk to Tenon are ubiquitous and play a 
useful role in making ordinary things in our daily lives and in business much 
easier. But software code is a combination of mathematical algorithms that 
compute to some end process of function, and mathematical algorithms, unless 
they are associated with a process that is transformative and new, are an inherent 
law of nature and consequently patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
Transformation itself occurs only when something is “reduced to a different state 
or thing,”46 and in many cases, despite the utility and value of many software 
solutions, they are not associated with a “transformative” process. Accordingly, 
software itself, like the mathematical algorithms underlying it, is generally patent 
ineligible. 
But this ineligibility is not the dire portent it might first seem. While patent 
protection offers certain perks, like the ability to seek relief if another 
independently developed a similar innovation, the patent ecosystem is arguably 
poisoned by the reality of constant policing, safeguarding and defending patent 
portfolios. Indeed, many would argue that these aspects of the patent protection 
structure outweigh its benefits. The most notorious threat comes from claims 
lodged by non-practicing entities (“NPEs”), pejoratively known as patent trolls. 
Generally, an NPE: (i) own patents, but does not produce products or invent 
patentable ideas on its own; (ii) licenses the patents it owns to other entities; and 
(iii) has a business practice of enforcing its patents against individuals or 
companies via what are perceived as aggressive means. Patent troll litigation has 
become so severe that several reform initiatives have come about to address the 
same; namely (i) the White House Council Report and the White House 
Legislative Priorities and Executive Action documents (the “White House 
Initiatives”);47 (ii) the Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal 
Disputes Act of 2013 (“SHIELD”);48 (iii) the Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 
2013;49 and (iv) the Patent Quality Improvement Act of 2013.50 
The White House Report indicates that patent infringement lawsuits filed by 
NPEs have tripled in the last few years and make up a whopping 62% of the patent 
infringement lawsuits,51 which is a 23% increase in these types of actions in the 
                                                
46 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876). 
47 See generally OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, FACT SHEET: WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE 
ON HIGH-TECH PATENT ISSUES (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06 
/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues [https://perma.cc/A5TW-
LVNA] [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET] (recognizing a White House initiative to 
prevent frivolous patent litigation). 
48 35 U.S.C. § 285(a) (2015). 
49 Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
50 Patent Quality Improvement Act of 2013, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013). 
51 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 1 (June 
2013). 
682 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
last few years.52 NPEs do not generally sell or provide patentable services, so they 
have little risk and little exposure to counterclaims for patent infringement. They 
can also file patent lawsuits with much less risk than traditional businesses. 
According to the report, the average legal costs for patent infringement cases are 
approximately $650,000 for small cases and $5,000,000 for large cases.53 These 
and other opportunity costs associated with defending trivial patent troll litigation 
suits are alleged to stifle innovation and economic growth of impacted industries. 
Under the auspices of creating a healthier patent ecosystem that champions 
innovation, businesses and consumers, the U.S. executive and legislative branches 
have both recently proposed measures to curb the above dangers. 
 
III.  KEY INITIATIVES 
 
On June 4, 2013, the White House published the White House Council Report 
and White House Legislative Priorities and Executive Action documents (“White 
House Initiatives”). The White House Initiatives proposed protecting consumers 
from potential liability associated with patent troll litigation; required more 
plaintiff transparency; and gave judges with more discretion with awarding 
attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party (under 35 U.S.C 285 as a sanction for 
abusive court filings and investing), for example.54 
On February 27, 2013, U.S. Representatives Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and Jason 
Chaffetz (R-UT) proposed SHIELD. Like the White House Initiatives, SHIELD 
similarly called for the non-prevailing litigant in a patent infringement lawsuit 
liable for the legal fees and costs of the prevailing party.55  
On May 22, 2013, Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) introduced the Patent Abuse 
Reduction Act of 2013.56 The Patent Abuse Reduction Act proposed: (i) attorneys’ 
fees to the prevailing party in an infringement lawsuit; (ii) required disclosure of 
plaintiffs with financial interest in an infringement action; and (iii) shifting the 
onerous costs of discovery to the requesting party.57 
                                                
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET, supra note 47, at  3–4. 
55 Press Release, Congressman Peter Defazio, Defazio Introduces SHIELD Act to 
Protect American Innovations, Jobs (Aug. 21, 2012), http://defazio.house.gov/media-
center/press-releases/defazio-introduces-shield-act-to-protect-american-innovation-jobs 
[https://perma.cc/6B9P-PFYK]. 
56 Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
57 Dennis Crouch, Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013 (S. 1013), PATENTLYO (May 
23, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/05/patent-abuse-reduction-act-of-2013-
s1013.html [https://perma.cc/CNX7-8N6D]; see also Press Release, Congressman John 
Cornyn, Senators Aim to End Patent Abuses That Cost U.S. Economy Billions of Dollars 
Every Year (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.cornyn.senate.gov/content/senators-aim-end-
patent-abuses-cost-us-economy-billions-dollars-every-year [https://perma.cc/9DHU-LEF9] 
(discussing provisions included in the Patent Act, including discovery limitations) and 
Patent Quality Improvement Act of 2013, S. 866, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
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On May 6, 2013, U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) introduced the Patent 
Quality Improvement Act of 2013.58 This bill proposes to expand on the 
protections incorporated in the AIA with respect to post-grant review of first-to-
file-covered business method pats in the financial products and services field at the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board.59 Specifically, the Patent Quality Improvement Act 
of 2013 would amend the AIA: (i) to apply the post-patent-grant review 
process/program to all covered business method patents; and (ii) to expand the 
term “cover business method patent” to include a patent that claims a method or 
corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in 
the practice, administration, or management of any enterprise, product, or service, 
except technological inventions.60 
NPEs do not discriminate: both solo entrepreneurs and Fortune 500 
companies are targets. The proposed NPE reform initiatives generally promise 
more transparency, the reduction of frivolous patent infringement suits, and the 
protection of businesses and consumers by reallocating the costs and risks of 
litigation. As such, on its face, legislation that would tend to curb abusive behavior 
of NPEs should be welcomed by patent owners. Certain corporate entities like 
Expedia and SAS have openly endorsed patent troll reform.61 Although the current 
legislation is presented as a means to address abuses by NPEs, it clearly is not 
limited to such abuses, as it has many provisions that are more broadly aimed. For 
example, the various initiatives include proposals to address the following issues, 
none of which are limited to the NPE context: 
 
1. Expanding the PTO’s transitional program to cover computer-
enabled business method patents; 
2. Changing the ITC standard for obtaining an injunction;  
3. Tightening functional claiming in the context of software patents; 
4. Discovery reform; and applying the post-patent-grant review 
process/program to cover more business method patents.62 
 
                                                
58 S. 866, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
59 See generally 157 CONG. REC. S5319, 2011 WL 3902927 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) 
(discussing the financial benefits of allowing for covered business method patents). 
60 See generally Legislation, CHARLES E. SCHUMER, U.S. SENATOR FOR NEW YORK, 
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/legislation.cfm [https://perma.cc/9UC9-AUPD] (noting 
Senator Schumer’s support for the Patent Quality Improvement Act of 2013). 
61 SAS Supports White House Efforts to Curtail Patent Trolls, SAS (Feb. 20, 2012) 
http://www.sas.com/en_us/news/press-releases/2014/february/patent-trolls.html 
[https://perma.cc/LL66-4L3U]. 
62 See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET, supra note 47 (discussing expanding PTO’s 
role, changing the ITC standard and tightening functional claiming); see also Adi Kamidar, 
The Patent Reform We Need to See from the Senate, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 31, 
2014) https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/03/patent-reform-we-need-see-senate 
[https://perma.cc/2ZTJ-SS3F ] (elaborating on the many ways legislature is limiting patent 
troll abuse including discovery reform and fee shifting). 
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Between the rulings in Alice and Tenon, the threat of patent troll litigation, and the 
evolving patent policy landscape surrounding patent protection, it is clear that 
practicing patents is a risky business, and may be a game best played by entities 
with deep pockets that can afford the often enormous costs associated with patent 
protection. Notwithstanding the legislative deaths of SHIELD, the Patent Abuse 
Reduction Act, and the Patent Quality Improvement Act, these initiatives 
undoubtedly mark the first of forthcoming legislative remedies aimed at cleaning 
the patent law ecosystem—trade secrets. 
Trade secrets may offer a safer method by which to protect the kinds of 
software solutions at issue in Alice and Tenon. Protection of trade secrets is 
effective immediately and does not require publication, which avoids the risks 
associated with protecting, defending and enforcing a patent.63 Rather than 
treading the waters of the patent law ecosystem, individuals and corporate entities 
alike may protect their innovations via trade secrets. All but two states (New York 
and Massachusetts) have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act64 (with some 
variation) and define the basic elements of a trade secret as follows: (i) some 
propriety process, formula or method that is not readily ascertainable; (ii) which 
has economic value; and (iii) the owners of the trade secret take reasonable steps to 
protect it.65  
Misappropriation of a trade secret is generally applicable when: (1) a trade 
secret was acquired by a third party by improper or unlawful means such as theft, 
bribery, misrepresentation, espionage and/or breach of a duty to maintain the 
confidentiality of a trade secret; and (2) a trade secret is misappropriated by an 
individual who: 
 
knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by 
improper means; or . . . [d]isclosure or use of a trade secret of another 
without express or implied consent by a person who: (i) [u]sed improper 
means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (ii) [a]t the time of 
disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his or her knowledge 
of the trade secret was (A) derived from or through a person who had 
utilized improper means to acquire it, (B) acquired under circumstances 
giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use, or (C) derived 
from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to 
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (iii) [b]efore a material change of 
                                                
63 See QR Spex, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. CV 03-6284-JFW (FMOx), 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 27378, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2004) (holding that trade secret protection 
was available until the patent was actually filed). 
64 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (1985).  
65 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.108 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-24-1 
(2015). 
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his or her position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret 
and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.66 
 
“‘Improper means’ includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or 
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through 
electronic or other means . . . .”67 Remedies for trade secret misappropriation 
include injunctions to prevent current or future harm; a claim for unjust enrichment 
resulting from the misappropriation, and, in the event the misappropriation is 
determined to be malicious, punitive damages that are twice the unjust enrichment 
amount.68  
The determination of whether trade secret requirements have been met is a 
question of fact and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, 
courts have held that advising employees of the existence of a trade secret, limiting 
access to a trade secret on a “need to know” basis, and controlling access to the 
trade secret are sufficient.69 But in other jurisdictions, employee exit interviews are 
a necessary measure to meet the “reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy” 
requirement.70 In determining whether a trade secret has independent economic 
value, courts have considered the effort and expense involved in developing the 
information to be a critical factor.71 Additionally courts have held that public 
disclosure of the potential trade secret through display, publication, advertising, or 
mention in open court can preclude trade secret protection.72  
Trade secrets at the federal level are protected by the Economic Espionage 
Act (“EEA”). The EEA criminalizes misappropriation of trade secrets by foreign 
governments. The EEA defines trade secrets as: 
 
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, 
or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, 
program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, 
                                                
66 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.108.010 (defining misappropriation of a trade secret); 
see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-24-2(1) (2015) (describing the definition of improper 
means). 
67 UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-24-2 (2015). 
68 See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.108 (defining misappropriation of a 
trade secret); UTAH CODE ANN. §13-24-1 (2015) (titling the section “Uniform Trade Secret 
Act”). 
69 See Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, Inc., 22 Cal. App. 4th 
853, 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); see also 
Leatt Corp. v. Innovation Safety Tech, LLC, No. 09-CV-1301-IEG (POR), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 37382, at *18 (2010) (applying alter ego and agency theories in a trade secret 
misappropriation claim).  
70 Gillis Assoc. Indus., Inc. v. Cari-All, Inc., 564 N.E.2d 881, 884–86 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1990).  
71 Ed Nowogroski Ins., Inc. v. Rucker, 971 P.2d 936, 942 (Wash. 1999).  
72 Woo, D.D.S. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 154 P.3d 236, 240–42 (2007) (quoting 
Machen Inc. v. Aircraft Design, Inc., 828 P.2d 73 (1992)). 
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processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or 
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized 
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing 
if— 
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such 
information secret; and (B) the information derives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, 
and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public; 
and (4) the term “owner,” with respect to a trade secret, means the person 
or entity in whom or in which rightful legal or equitable title to, or 
license in, the trade secret is reposed.73 
 
Like the patent arena, trade secrets legislation and policy are also in the midst 
of development, and national legislation has been proposed to create a national 
approach to trade secrets. To assist with creating national standards for trade 
secrets, Representative George Holding (R-NC) introduced the Trade Secrets 
Protection Act of 2014 (“TSPA”) to the House of Representatives in July 2014.74 
TSPA would amend the EEA to allow private-party trade secret misappropriation 
claims in federal district court.75 Private-party plaintiffs would be able to petition a 
federal district court for an injunction to prevent actual or potential damage for loss 
or disclosure of their trade secrets.76 In the event an injunction is insufficient, the 
court would be generally empowered to take such action “determined appropriate” 
to “protect the trade secret.”77 TPSA also permits civil seizure of property, and 
requires an expedited hearing—no later than seven days after an order.78 
Depending on the extent of the misappropriation, courts under the TSPA may 
also impose payment of a reasonable royalty for the duration the trade secret 
continues to be misappropriated: (i) damages based on actual loss caused, or 
(ii) unjust enrichment.79 For willful and malicious acts of misappropriation, 
punitive damages three times the award amount and recovery of reasonable 
attorney’s fees (for the prevailing party) would also be available.80  
In April 2014, U.S. Senators Christopher Coons (D-DE) and Orrin Hatch (R-
UT) introduced the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”).81 The DTSA 
substantially aligns with the TSPA and Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), and 
would also amend the EEA to permit civil actions in federal court for trade secret 
                                                
73 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (defining theft of a trade 
secret and providing fines and imprisonment for theft of a trade secret). 
74 H.R. 5233, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014). 
75 See generally id. (providing “[f]ederal jurisdiction for the theft of trade secrets, and 
for other purposes”). 
76 Id. at § 3(A). 
77 Id. at § 3(A)(iii). 
78 Id. at § 2 (A)–(B).  
79 Id. at § 3(A)(iii)–(B)(i).  
80 Id. at § 3(C)–(D). 
81 S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014). 
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misappropriation. Both DTSA and TSPA have a five-year statute of limitations, 
while the UTSA and most state laws have a three-year statute of limitations. 
Internationally, trade secrets are protected under the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) Agreement of 1995, which established 
international standards for trade secret protection.82 The international standards 
closely resemble the approach of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act followed by most 
states in the United States. Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement provides as 
follows:  
 
Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing 
information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, 
acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary 
to honest commercial practices so long as such information: 
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise 
configuration and assembly of its components, generally known 
among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that 
normally deal with the kind of information in question; 
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and 
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the 
person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.83 
 
Thus, as compared to individual state trade secrets acts, the basic elements are 
the same: (1) the trade secret must not be generally known/readily accessible or 
ascertainable; (2) the trade secret must have commercial/independent economic 
value; and (3) reasonable steps must be taken to protect the secrecy of the 
information.84 
 
IV.  TRADE SECRETS DISCUSSION 
 
Trade secrets encompass customer lists, technical data, pricing information, 
business and marketing strategies, product drawings, reports, manufacturing 
processes, formulas, general know-how, and, of course, patent-ineligible software. 
So long as a trade secret is not generally known or readily accessible or 
ascertainable, it has independent economic value and is reasonably protected, and 
courts will permit equitable relief for trade secret misappropriations.85 Case law 
shows that certain factors are paramount: (i) limiting employee access to trade 
secrets and employee execution; (ii) employee exit interviews and separation 
agreements; (iii) marking trade secret materials as “confidential” or “restricted”; 
(iv) using industry-standard safeguarding technologies and protocols (such as 
                                                
82 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including 
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 33 I.L.M. 83, 98 (1994). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 59 A.L.R. 4TH 641 (1988); see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-24-2 (2015). 
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restricted encryption, administrative log-ins and facility key cards); (v) restricting 
the mobility of trade secrets; (vi) and other steps reasonable necessary to maintain 
the secrecy of a trade secret.86 Although protecting trade secrets generally shields 
one from the issues associated with practicing patents, it also comes with a certain 
degree of risk associated with managing individuals within an organization and 
preventing disclosure of trade secrets. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Gottschalk, Diehr, Alice, and Tenon all held that computer programs that do 
not transform a business method or process are patent ineligible if the applicable 
method or process is not transformed into a new, inventive concept. Although 
patent protection provides a limited monopoly on the applicable invention, the 
business practices of NPEs and legislation purposed to mitigate the perils of 
practicing patents have created an ecosystem of uncertainty and risk that many are 
not willing or able to expose themselves to. 
Fortunately, patents are not the only game in town. Trade secrets offer an 
alternative to patent-ineligible innovations and to the problems and perils of 
protecting, defending and enforcing patents. Although there is currently limited 
trade secret legislation on the national level, nearly all states have adopted, with 
little substantive variation, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Unlike patent-eligibility 
requirements that precluded software in Gottschalk, Diehr, Alice, and Tenon from 
patent protection, no trade secret is automatically deemed out of scope. Trade 
secrets encompass anything of value, so long as it is not generally known and 
reasonable steps are taken, such as the use of employment agreements that include 
confidentiality and non-compete clauses, to preserve the secrecy of the invention. 
Moreover, there are active efforts to put into place a more robust federal system of 
trademark protection, including the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Trade Secret 
Protection Act, which both seek to create benchmark standards for civil trade 
secret misappropriations in federal courts by amending the Economic Espionage 
Act. 
                                                
86 Gillis Assoc. Indus. Inc., 564 N.E.2d at 886; see also William M. Corrigan & 
Jeffrey L. Schultz, Trade Secret Litigation — An Updated Overview, 71 J. MO. B. 18, 23 
(2015) (summarizing trade secret litigation). 
